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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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February 23, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-127)
Nuclear Weapons Master Plan, Phase III (S)

The attached National Security Decision Directive, NSDD-127, documents the President's guidance on the next phase of work in developing the Nuclear Weapons Master Plan initially tasked by NSDD-13. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Robert C. McFarlane

Attachment

NSDD-127 (S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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February 23, 1984

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 127

Nuclear Weapons Master Plan, Phase III (U)

I have completed my review of the Nuclear Weapons Master Plan Phase II Report. I am encouraged by the progress that is being made. It is evident that much effort has gone into the analysis and initial identification of strategic support structure needs. However, there is still a significant amount of work to be accomplished. (U)

Work should continue to define, as rapidly as practical, the details of the strategic support structure acquisition portion of the Master Plan. At the same time, we must ensure that our strategic forces modernization efforts proceed as currently programmed. Improvements in strategic support elements should be accomplished in consonance with, and not at the expense of, the critical strategic force modernization program. Therefore, a central element of the next phase of the Master Plan development must be a clear, economically affordable, time-phased acquisition program for these required complementary efforts. (S)

An enduring intelligence capability is needed to ensure, should deterrence fail, that we are able to employ U.S. forces effectively, terminate hostilities, and support the varied responsibilities of the Presidency. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence should define and identify funding requirements for near-term and long-term programs to provide the requisite intelligence systems endurance while satisfying peacetime and crisis intelligence requirements. (S)

While some of the requirements for an enduring intelligence capability needed to employ our military forces effectively do overlap with those associated with supporting the Presidency, others do not. Recognizing the need for appropriate security compartmentalization, efforts to provide requisite endurance for our intelligence capability should be coordinated with ongoing sensitive compartmented programs to ensure that the national leadership will survive and endure. This should ensure that the full range of requirements are understood and avoid any unnecessary duplication of effort. (TS)

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To the extent that resources will permit, a more vigorous survivability and endurance program should be initiated beginning in FY 1985, especially in the intelligence area. Deficiencies in this area are of sufficient magnitude to warrant more expeditious action. (S)

The Phase II Report identifies a wide range of continuing and new tasks necessary to complete and fully refine the Master Plan for supporting national policy. There is a need to address the potential contribution of non-strategic nuclear forces in the context of the Master Plan development program. However, with respect to the next phase of this work, the immediate priority should be to continue to refine and complete the core U.S. strategic program and its supporting structure of communications (including the contribution of commercial systems where appropriate), command, control, intelligence (including the contribution that tactical and intelligence related assets can make to the strategic program) and logistics. The modernization of our strategic TRIAD of nuclear forces and the critical C3I and logistics associated with them must receive the highest level of sustained support if our strategic modernization program is to remain on schedule and to be able to support national policy. (S)

In order to ensure that these efforts are consistent and properly time-phased with other DoD and Federal Government activities, the Department of Defense should conduct a working level review of progress with the National Security Council Staff (with DCI representatives participating in the intelligence related portions) in the June 1984 timeframe. This review should be followed in December 1984 by a written report provided by the Department of Defense. The appropriate intelligence related sections of this report should be developed in full coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence. The report should be provided in early December in sufficient time to be utilized in conjunction with the Fiscal Year 1986 DOD and National Foreign Intelligence Program budget submissions. (S)

Ronald Reagan

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